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Abstract 
 
This report presents a comprehensive review of the maritime safety regimes and provides 
recommendations on how to improve the system. The results show a complex legal framework 
which generates a high amount of inspections and overlapping of inspection areas where no 
cross-recognition is established by the various stakeholders. While the safety system seems to be 
successful in eliminating substandard vessels and while average insurance claims costs are 
substantially lower for inspected vessels than not inspected vessels, the results indicate that the 
economic conditions of the shipping market also have an effect on safety quality besides the 
frequency of inspections. No significant differences can be found between industry inspections 
and port state control inspections with respect to decreasing the probability of casualty. The 
system could be made more effective by combining data sources on inspections and use them 
respectively to improve risk profiling and to decrease the frequency of inspections performed on 
ship types such as tankers. The results further indicate a lack of proper implementation of the 
International Safety Management Code (ISM code) and conventions with reference to working 
and living conditions of crew (ILO 147). A revision of the ISM code and more emphasis on 
enforcement of ILO 147 could further enhance the level of safety at sea.  
 
The authors would like to thank several inspection regimes for their cooperation in providing 
inspection data and in allowing the observation of surveys and inspections on 26 vessels. In 
addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the data providers for the casualty data, 
Clarkson’s for the economic data as well as two P&I Clubs in making data on insurance claims 
available. 
                                                
1 Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, NL-3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 
email: knapp@few.eur.nl or franses@few.eur.nl. This working paper does not reflect the view of the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we consider the inspection system in the maritime industry, by which we mean the 
summary of all safety inspections that are performed onboard commercial vessels such as 
mandatory and non-mandatory inspections, surveys and audits. We provide a critical review of 
the status of the present system and give recommendations on how to improve it. With 
inspection system, we mean the summary of all safety inspections that are performed onboard 
commercial vessels such as mandatory and non-mandatory inspections, surveys and audits. 
 
The topic of the effectiveness of port state control has been treated in literature from various 
angles. Payoyo (1994) gives an overview of the implementation of international conventions 
through port state control and concludes that port state control (Paris MoU) has been successful 
in eliminating substandard vessels. Carriou et al. (2007) offers an econometric analysis on the 
effectiveness of inspections but bases the analysis only on data from one country (Sweden) and 
therefore ignores the effect of other countries in other regimes or industry inspections performed 
in the name of safety. From a system’s perspective, Wang (2001) offers a review of IMO’s status 
on formal safety assessment which is a relatively new approach for the shipping industry and not 
yet used extensively. 
 
We use qualitative and quantitative analysis to cover the topic at hand. For the qualitative part, 
inspections on 26 vessels were observed and the area of inspections compared. For the 
quantitative part of this article, we partly re-use the same dataset as used in Knapp and Franses 
(2007a) but complement it further with additional data on variables of interest including an 
indicator of the economic status of the shipping industry. The underlying dataset is a 
combination of port state control inspection data from various port state control (PSC) regimes2 
of 183,819 inspections (1999 to 2004), casualty data from three different sources (IMO, Lloyd’s 
Maritime Intelligence Unit and Lloyd’s Register Fairplay) and vetting inspection data from two 
vetting regimes. This dataset is then complemented by insurance claim data from two P&I Clubs 
who would like to remain anonymous and the Clarkson’s Shipping Index (Earnings per day) and 
second hand prices of vessels. 
 
Through regression analysis, we measure the effect of port state control inspections of six 
regimes, vetting inspections from two regimes and audits performed for the International Safety 
Management Code (ISM). In addition, we also analyze the effect of ratification of international 
conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) by flag states. 
 
This article builds on the quantitative findings but complements it with the qualitative analysis of 
the complexity of the safety regimes and an in-depth analysis of the various types of inspections 
that are performed onboard the vessels, their associated costs, frequencies and compares them 
with insurance claims. This is to provide a more detailed picture of the situation at hand and to 
give recommendations on how to improve the system. 
 
In section 2, we therefore provide an analysis of the complexity of the maritime safety regime 
which is followed by a summary of all inspections that are performed in the name of safety in 
section 3. Section 4 provides a summary of inspection frequencies, their costs and insurance 
claims while section 5 complements descriptive statistics with the results from regression 
analysis and measures the effect of inspections on the probability of casualty per frequency of 
                                                
2 Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Caribbean MoU, Viña del Mar Agreement on PSC, the United 
States Coast Guard, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Indian Ocean MoU. 
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inspection. Section 6 presents our conclusions and gives recommendations on how to improve 
the system. 
 
 
2. The complexity of the safety regime 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the players of the safety regime. The legal framework is 
created by three major international organizations namely, the United Nations (UN), the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
by country-specific legislation3. The classification societies provide the technical expertise 
during ship building and technical maintenance of the vessel. In addition, classification societies 
can be authorized to perform statutory surveys on behalf of flag states that have the 
responsibility to enforce their legal base which can be a combination of the international 
conventions of which the flag state is signatory and/or its own legal base. The ship owner has the 
responsibility to comply with the combined legal bases. 
 
Figure 1: Players of the Safety Regime in General 
 
 
The line between the actual ship owner, operator or technical manager of the vessel is not 
completely clear in shipping and therefore complicates enforcement of the legal instruments. 
The reason of the existence of the port state control regime derives from the fact that a certain 
percentage of ship owners and flag states use the legal “loophole” created by the international 
legal framework and try to save costs by operating below the minimum safety standards. This 
can cause accidents and damage to the environment, the cargo and human lives. Worldwide, 
there are currently ten safety regimes in place to cover most of the coastal states. 
 
Port state control can best be described as the second line of defense while flag states should be 
the first line of defense in eliminating substandard vessels. This set-up further creates a highly 
political legislative process on the international level where technicalities are often ignored and 
political decisions prevail. A clear example thereof is that none of the ten existing port state 
control regimes recognizes the inspections performed in another regime. In addition, such 
recognition is also not guaranteed within the same regime. This further leads to an impairment of 
targeting vessels for inspections since only inspections of one regime are taken into account 
within this particular regime and all others are ignored. 
                                                
3 This could be for instance the “acquis communautaire” for the European Union or OPA 90 for the US or any 
other country specific legislation.  
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In addition to port state control to eliminate substandard vessels, the industry solution to this 
problem is represented by the vetting inspections which are performed so far on oil tankers, 
chemical tankers and bulk carriers. The vetting inspections are primarily geared to cover the 
cargo owners from legal claims in case of an accident. These types of inspections create a strong 
commercial incentive for the ship owner to comply to the vetting inspection requirements since 
the outcome of these inspections will determine if the ship gets cargo or not. None of the vetting 
inspection regimes recognizes inspections which were performed in another regime nor does 
port state control accept or use these inspections to enhance risk profiling of their own systems. 
It leaves the industry with a high level of inspections to the detriment of the crew onboard 
vessels. All of these inspections are performed in the name of safety but in reality derive from 
various motivations and stakeholders’ interests.  
 
The International Maritime Organization is promoting the harmonization of port state control 
inspections at a global level and in 2006, the port state control regimes could for the first time 
attend the flag state implementation sub-committee meeting (FSI) as a member of the 
organization. A working group in the harmonization of PSC was established including the 
revision of deficiency codes but little progress was made so far. Given this situation, the next 
section will give an overview of all inspections that are performed. 
 
 
3. Overview of inspections performed 
This section provides an overview of the different kind of inspections, surveys and audits that 
are carried out on ships and compares their inspection content in order to identify overlapping 
areas. Security related inspections are only listed for the sake of information but are not further 
taken into consideration in the rest of the article since its main emphasis is safety. 
 
3.1. General overview of inspection exposure 
An overview of the total exposure to inspections is given in Figure 2 which provides information 
about the inspection source, the requirements with deriving inspection types/surveys and 
inspection areas. The last column lists the ship types since inspections vary according to ship 
types. One can easily see from this graph what the port state and flag state control area is as 
compared to the influence of industry inspections. 
 
The inspection requirements can originate from various sources such as port state control, flag 
state inspections, ISM and ISPS4 audits or classification surveys on behalf of a flag states (acting 
as recognized organization) or for the vessel to remain in class5. Insurance companies such as 
P&I Clubs perform their own inspections for insurance coverage purposes. Most inspections 
however are performed by the industry and are called vetting inspections performed on oil 
tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers and bulk carriers on behalf of oil majors or other cargo 
owners or on behalf of the ship owner. (CDI, OCIMF, Rightship, Oil Majors)6. Only one system 
provides actual commercial incentives for an inspection (Greenaward Foundation). 
 
Port state control and flag state inspections cover the statutory requirements. Classification 
societies perform most of the surveys based on statutory requirements and by authorization of a 
flag state. 
 
 
                                                
4 ISM = International Safety Management, ISPS = International Ship and Port Security 
5 A ship does not necessary have to be in “class” in order to trade but it is highly recommended. 
6 CDI = Chemical Distribution Institute, OCIMF = Oil Companies International Marine Forum 
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Figure 2: Summary of Total Inspection and Audit Exposure 
 
Source: compiled by author from various legal sources and inspections 
Note: CAS = Condition Assessment Scheme, ESP = Enhanced Survey Program, CAP = Condition Assessment 
Program 
 
IMO has tried to synchronize the various types of inspections through the “Harmonized System 
of Survey’s and Certification” and in essence, four types of mandatory inspections can be 
identified and are shown in the graph which covers the inspection areas listed next to the 
inspection types. Depending on the type of survey (e.g. initial, annual, renewal, etc.) the content 
and intensity of the inspection areas is changed accordingly. In addition to the mandatory 
inspection types and areas, two mandatory survey programs are identified and are also normally 
provided by the classification societies. The first one is CAS (Condition Assessment Scheme) 
based on MARPOL and the second is the ESP (Enhanced Survey Program) based on SOLAS7. 
 
Besides the items listed above, two types of audits are identified in Figure 2 - the ISM 
(International Safety Management) audit and the ISPS (International Ship and Port Security) 
audit which are both SOLAS requirements. This certification is split into a shipboard part and a 
company part where the shipboard part has to be completed every five years with one 
intermediate audit half way). Some flag administrations have not yet authorized classification 
societies to perform these audits but many flag states have done so and this area is therefore also 
widely covered by classification societies. 
 
Cargo owners have considerable power through their vetting inspections for certain ship types. It 
becomes clear from the graph that the targeted ship types are chemical tankers, oil tankers, gas 
carriers and bulk carriers for the industry inspections while inspections based on statutory 
                                                
7 The Condition Assessment Scheme originated from an amendment to Annex I of MARPOL Annex I (Regulation 
13G) and can be applied to single hull tankers above 15 years of age. It is intended to complement the requirements 
of the Enhanced Survey Program of SOLAS which applies to bulk carriers and oil tankers. Both require a different 
scope of survey depending on the age of the vessel including thickness measurements and rate the coating 
conditions of the tanks as GOOD, FAIR and POOR which is sometimes important information for vetting 
inspections. 
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requirements are valid for all ship types. The various inspection systems do reference each other 
but there is no cross-recognition. 
 
CDI inspections originate from the ship owner and are therefore owned and paid by the ship 
owner. Inspections are based on a standardized questionnaire covering all areas of shipboard 
operations and are split up into “statutory requirements” (based on the international 
conventions), “required” (as per industry Code of Practice) and “desired” (required by CDI 
participants or users of the reports) requirements. An inspection normally takes around 8-10 
hours where particular emphasis is placed on cargo operations and the competence of crew. CDI 
inspections are primarily performed on chemical tankers. 
 
Sire inspections are performed by OCIMF (Oil Companies International Marine Forum) and 
originate from cargo owners. The inspections also cover more or less the same areas as CDI with 
a heavy influence on cargo operations and can take 8 to 10 hours. Ship Owners have some time 
to comment to the issued report before it becomes available online. These types of vetting 
inspections are primarily for oil tankers. While the standardized questionnaire serves as a basis, 
some oil majors have additional requirements and will add these requirements during an 
inspection which can be confusing for the ship owners and their crew since no split between 
statutory requirements and other requirements is made. In addition, oil majors normally perform 
their own inspections where the basic requirements are according to the SIRE inspections but 
additional requirements per oil major are added to the inspection and are not published in the 
SIRE report. 
 
Rightship is a ranking system which combines information obtained through vetting inspections, 
port state control, casualties, ship particular information and ship owner information. It ranks 
vessels according to a rating score (1 to 5 stars where 5 stars represents a very good vessel with 
low risk). It is based on a joint venture between BHP Billiton Freight Trading and Logistics and 
Rio Tinto Shipping. The inspections cover tankers and bulk carriers but are primarily for dry 
bulk carriers. A Rightship Inspection can take from 8 to 48 hours and covers all aspects of 
shipboard operations in addition to ship structure and cargo handling equipment including hatch 
covers which is important for dry bulk carriers. Inspectors perform ballast water tank inspections 
and evaluate the conditions of the cargo holds. 
 
The last kind of inspection that is performed on vessels (oil tankers) originates from the 
Greenaward Foundation. These inspections are paid by the ship owner. An initial inspection will 
take approx. 9 hours and cover all aspects of shipboard operations. In addition to the shipboard 
audit, an office audit (2 days) is performed to evaluate the shore based management systems and 
support to the vessels. After successful completion, the ship receives a certificate (Greenaward) 
and the ship owner can obtain discounts on harbor dues from ports participating in the program. 
Once the vessel is “Greenaward Certified”, it needs to undergo annual or intermediate surveys to 
remain certified. The Greenaward Foundation is a non-profit foundation. Over the years, the 
Greenaward Certificate has not yet been officially recognized by port state control regimes. The 
approach is more complete and includes shore-side and ship-side elements of the operations. 
 
In addition to the statutory requirement for CAS and ESP, some oil majors ask a ship owner to 
participate in CAP (Condition Assessment Program) for either hull or machinery. Those 
programs are offered by classification societies and are purely voluntary and provide the ship 
owner with a rating (CAP 1, 2 or 3 where CAP 1 represent the best rating) which is important for 
some oil majors. There is an overlapping of CAP with CAS where the main difference is that 
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CAS is a statutory requirement and its end users are the flag states while CAP is a voluntary 
program required by oil majors who decide on the minimum of the CAP rating. 
 
3.2. Detailed comparison of inspection areas 
This subsection provides a comparison of the inspection areas that are performed onboard ships 
(excluding security) and will only concentrate on inspections performed on ships. It will identify 
the areas that are overlapping. An inspection matrix was compiled based on the observation of 
26 inspections on various vessels and interviews with the inspectors and can be seen in appendix 
1 for easier reference. 
 
The table is split into the main areas of inspection such as an administrative part, living and 
working conditions onboard the ship, the safety management system, areas related to safety and 
fire appliances, navigation and communication, ship and cargo operations including pollution 
prevention, machinery related areas and stability and structural related areas. The source of 
inspection is listed when applicable which can be a combination of the international conventions 
plus flag state requirements and additional industry requirements besides the statutory 
requirements. Next, the parties performing the inspections are identified and their coverage is 
indicated. The last column provides guidance on the crew that is involved in the inspections. For 
some vetting inspections and class surveys, the ship superintendent will normally also be 
onboard the vessel to assist the crew. 
 
One can see from the table, that certificates are referenced by everybody and that the main areas 
of inspections are more or less covered by all types of inspections. Living and Working 
Conditions of the crew are mainly covered by the inspection rounds and the actual living space 
of the crew (their cabins and other facilities) is hardly inspected. 
 
The industry inspections such as CDI/OCIMF, Rightship and Greenaward pay more attention to 
ship and cargo operations and spend considerably more time with crew members to interview 
them on operational issues. These items are primarily referenced during port and flag state 
inspections. Drills might be performed by some safety regimes such as the USCG or flag states 
but are not performed frequently by other inspectors and the inspection of the lifeboat primarily 
emphasizes the overall condition of the lifeboat, its launching devices and embarkation 
procedures as well as the lifeboat equipment. The inspection of safety and fire appliances is also 
covered by all types of inspections. For some items, the inspection might go into more details 
and entail the actual testing of the equipment which is merely performed during class surveys 
while others will only refer to expiry dates of the last survey/inspection that was performed 
shore side (e.g. for life rafts). Items related to navigation and communication is also covered by 
all inspection types including chart corrections, passage planning, nautical publications and the 
overall impression of the officer on watch with reference to the handling of the equipment 
(radar, echo sounder, radio equipment, etc.) 
 
Difficult to inspect is the safety management system since it draws from all areas. All 
inspections do cover some ISM related questions and the actual validity of the presented 
paperwork only becomes evident after a general deck round and interview with crew members. 
It might be that the paperwork related to ISM is in compliance but not implemented onboard. 
Inspection systems such as the vetting inspections do emphasize more on this aspect where 
Greenaward also performs company audits shore-side. Authorized classification societies or flag 
states perform separate audits to ensure that the safety management system is implemented in 
practice but inspections, due to the time constraint in conducting surveys, are normally only 
looking at the surface. 
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As mentioned earlier, ballast water tank and cargo holds inspections are difficult to perform and 
are primarily done by classification societies. Rightship pays more attention to actual physical 
inspections while port states will only proceed either required by their policies (e.g. expanded 
inspections in the EU) or when perceived necessary. The various programs (ESP, CAS or CAP) 
for the conditions of coatings in the ballast tanks and cargo tanks (when applicable) are normally 
only referenced and physical inspections thereof are kept to a minimum. 
 
The table gives a good indication of some of the overlapping of the inspections that are 
performed on ships from port states, flag states, vetting inspections and other industry 
inspections.  
 
 
4. Inspection Frequencies, Costs and P& I Club Insurance Claims 
This section provides an overview of inspection frequencies, their associated costs and insurance 
claims in order to add an economic dimension to safety inspections. Table 1 gives an overview 
of the frequency of inspections and their estimated yearly costs. The estimated inspection costs 
of a port state control inspection is USD 747 per inspection and is an average figure of 
inspections with zero deficiencies versus inspection with deficiencies including a 20% 
administrative charge8. Total estimated port state control costs for inspection with zero 
deficiencies are USD 12,5 Million per year (USD 15 Million including administration) or USD 
34,39 Million for all inspections (zero and no zero deficiencies). There is no reliable estimate of 
the total benefit of port state control to society. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Inspection Frequency, Allocated Time and Costs (USD/year) 
in USD 
Estim. 
Frequency Time (hrs) 
Estim. 
Costs Estim. Costs 
Estim. 
Total Cost 
Inspection Type yearly*) 
Allocated 
Onboard 
Shore 
Side/Insp. 
Ship 
Side/Insp. 
Per 
Year 
Port State Control 2 5 747 288 2,070 
Flag State Control 1 8 747 441 1,188 
Class Annual Survey 1 10 10,362 517 10,879 
ISM Audit 0.5 9 2,682 487 1,584 
Insurance (P&I Club) 0.5 8 3,048 441 1,744 
Industry Inspections: Tankers 6 10 17,663 566 29,702 
Industry Inspections: Bulk 1 10 6,250 566 6,816 
Industry Inspections: Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Tankers 11 50 35,248 2,739 47,166 
Total Dry Bulk 6 50 23,835 2,739 24,280 
Total Other Ship Types 5 40 17,585 2,173 17,464 
Note: compiled by author, *) the ISM Audits and P&I Club Inspections are not performed yearly; For Industry 
Inspections, administrative portion of 20% are added which might be higher in reality due to substantial 
amount of preparation work 
 
The surveyor costs differ across countries and this change is not taken into consideration as data 
from 53 countries are in the total port state control inspection dataset. In reality, the presented 
figures might therefore somehow differ and most probably be lower as they are based on average 
                                                
8 As per information obtained from the Maritime and Coast Guard Agency, UK 
9 According to Knapp, S. (2006), page 34 and based on data from the Maritime and Coast Agency in combination 
with 183,000 inspections. 
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costs of a developed country. For the purpose of this study, the figures should merely give an 
overall indication on the costs associated with port state control and to give a conservative 
estimate. The same figure is then used for flag state inspections. 
 
The remaining data is a summary from several sources from the shipping industry such as 
classification societies and ship owners of which the companies would like to remain 
anonymous. The table is split up into three groups. The estimated total frequency of inspection 
for tankers (oil and chemical tankers) is estimated to be at 11 inspections per year which can of 
course vary per ship type and age of the vessel. As the age increases (above 10 or 15 years), the 
frequency of industry inspections can increase. For dry bulk carriers, the inspection frequency is 
estimated to be 6 inspections and for all other ship types it is estimated to be as 5 inspections. 
 
Shore based costs include the costs for an inspection itself including travel expenses as well as 
an administrative portion of preparing the inspections and to comment on the inspection reports 
which can take considerable amount of time on the ship operator’s or owner’s side. Total yearly 
costs per vessel associated with inspections vary from USD 47,166 for tankers to USD 17,464 
for other ship types which are not part of the industry vetting inspection system. These costs 
represent total costs where the ship owner’s portion would be the portion without port state 
control and without the flag state inspections. 
 
It is difficult to bring these costs in relation to the costs that are associated with casualties. One 
attempt was made to gather insurance claim data but only two sources from the industry could be 
obtained of P&I Clubs10 who were willing to provide claim figures for the years 2000 to 2004 
per ship type and claim category. An average claim figure per ship was calculated and is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Average P&I Club Claim Figures per Vessel and Year (2000 to 2004) 
Average Claim in USD 
(2000 to 2004) C
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GG & Container 9,794 36,071 18,084 14,396 46,796 16,303 151,181 41,804 
Dry Bulk 14,767 58,311 9,955 11,495 51,078 73,207 182,399 57,316 
Tanker 42,936 88,277 21,079 18,216 272,016 44,596 609,252 156,624 
Passenger 1,885 56,142 9,209 15,310 18,616 9,015 883,549 141,961 
Other 9,231 18,801 478 6,446 6,886 38,357 557,692 91,127 
Average/vessel  15,722 51,521 11,761 13,172 79,078 36,296 476,815 97,766 
Note: compiled by author, GA = general average H&M = Hull and Machinery 
 
In reality, the figures are higher than presented in the table due to the fact that the claim figures 
are based on actual claims above the deductible. The deductible can vary per ship type, size or 
ownership of the vessel. In addition, it varies considerably between hull and machinery (H&M) 
and other P&I club claims11. The figures presented in the table can therefore only be seen as a 
very rough idea of the magnitude of casualty claims per ship type. 
 
                                                
10 The P&I Clubs wish to remain anonymous. 
11 As per industry sources, the deductible for Hull and Machinery can be between USD 50,000 to 250,000 and for 
P& I Clubs between USD 5,000 – 30,000 for personnel and USD 10,000 to 100,000 for all other claims. 
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The inspection costs and insurance claims are further summarized in Table 3 which also gives 
the percentage to total inspection costs for all vessels and the average per vessel per year. The 
result indicate that the total average inspection costs per ship of USD 24,768 seems to be 
reasonable in relation to the average insurance claim costs of USD 97,766 which in reality might 
be an even higher figure. If one compares the percentages of the inspection costs to the total with 
the percentage of insurance claims for each ship type, one can observe that the two percentages 
are not necessarily in line for passenger vessels where the insurance claims (29.1%) are 
substantially higher than the inspection costs (14.1%). For tankers on the other hand, the higher 
inspection costs (38.1%) seem to be in line with the insurance claims (32%). 
 
Table 3: Average Inspection Costs versus Insurance Claims in USD (2000 to 2004) 
In USD per vessel Inspection Costs 
%  
to total 
Insurance 
Claims 
%  
to total 
GG & Container 17,464 14.1% 41,804 8.6%
Dry Bulk 24,280 19.6% 57,316 11.7%
Tanker 47,166 38.1% 156,624 32.0%
Passenger 17,464 14.1% 141,961 29.1%
Other 17,464 14.1% 91,127 18.6%
Total All Vessels 123,838 100% 488,832 100%
Average per Vessel/year 24,768 97,766 
Source: compiled by author 
 
In order to get an impression about the difference in insurance claims of vessel that were 
inspected with vessels that were not inspected, Figure 3 combines the inspection data set with 
the casualty dataset and insurance claims data and present the average claim figures of inspected 
versus non inspected vessels per ship type. 
 
Figure 3: Average Claims of Inspected versus Non-Inspected Vessels per Ship Type in USD 
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The graph was produced the following way. The total casualty dataset was combined with the 
insurance claim costs as listed previously in Table 2 and then aggregated per IMO number in 
order to obtain an average claim amount per ship since one ship can have more than one type of 
claim. 
 
The result was then merged with the inspection dataset in order to identify if a ship has been 
inspected or not inspected. The result is then given in Figure 3 and one can easily see that not 
inspected vessels have higher average claim costs than inspected vessels. The difference is 
highest for tankers and other ship types and lowest for dry bulk vessels. For tankers this can 
easily be explained due to the heavy exposure to vetting inspections. If one would aggregate 
these figures further and make them independent of ship types, the average claim of inspected 
vessels would be USD 42,819 versus USD 143,386 for a non inspected vessel which is roughly 
3.3 times the costs of inspected vessels. These figures seem to indicate that insurance claims 
costs are substantially lower for inspected vessels than for not inspected vessels. 
 
 
5. The Effect of Inspections to Decrease the Probability of Casualty 
The last part of this article is based on the probability of casualty (very serious, serious and less 
serious) per frequency of inspection and is based on a model that extends the one used in Knapp 
and Franses (2007a) and which is based on a dataset of the world fleet for the time period 1999 
to 2004. The casualties are grouped according to IMO MSC Circular 953 of December 2000 and 
are grouped into very serious, serious and less serious casualties. 
 
The total inspection information is merged with casualties per IMO number and is then 
complemented with economic data. The whole dataset is then aggregated by IMO number to 
provide average values for certain variables or sums of inspections per vessel. This distinction 
will be explained later on in detail. A separate model is created for each type of casualty and 
provides the partial effect of a list of variables which should give an indication of the 
effectiveness of the safety regime in addition to economic variables.  
 
Variables of particular interest are the ratification of legal instruments by a flag state or a country 
of the beneficial owner, the ratification of the Merchant Shipping Conventions (ILO 147 and its 
Protocol), the inspection variables (port state control and vetting inspections), the ISM audit and 
economic variables. ILO 147 is of interest because it provides the basis for shipboard conditions 
of employment and living conditions. These variables were not included in Knapp and Franses 
(2007a) due to lack of data at that time.  
 
The models provide the estimated probability (P) of casualty (one model per type of seriousness) 
and are based on binary logistic regression. For a detailed explanation of the binary logistic 
regression which is a standard econometric technique, one can refer to Franses and Paap (2001, 
Chapter 4). The dependent variable (y) in this case is “casualty” (1) or “no casualty” (0). The 
model is presented in Equation 1 where the term xiβ changes according to the model in question 
and is given in Equation 2. The variables are listed in Table 4 for further reference.  
 
The variables are based on an aggregated dataset (per IMO) and the variable type (D for dummy 
or C for continuous) and its aggregation (a for average or s for sums) is listed for further detail in 
the second last column of the table. The probabilities produced are for any individual ship (i) and 
the rest of the notation is defined as follows: ℓ represents the variable groups, nℓ is the total 
number of variables within each group of ℓ and k is an index from 1 to nℓ.  
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Equation 1: Probability of Casualty per seriousness 
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One could argue that the dataset contains too many observations where y = 1 (casualties) versus 
0 due to the construction of the dataset since casualties of a six year time period are merged 
against the world fleet as per a certain time frame. The underlying question of concern would be 
if this can have a significant effect on the results? As shown in Cramer, Franses and Slagter 
(1999) where this was tested for various sizes of a reduced dataset of zeros, no significant 
explanatory power could be found in adding additional zero’s (ships with no casualties) to the 
dataset at hand. 
 
From Table 4, one can easily see that there are my variables which can measure the effect of 
inspections on the probability of casualty apart from regular ship particular information. 
Changes in ship particulars such as change of ownership, class withdrawals, the ship yard 
country where the vessel was primarily built or inspections performed by other safety regimes 
(be it port state control or vetting inspection regimes) all can have an effect. One therefore has to 
take a comprehensive approach including indicators of the economic situation of the shipping 
market which was introduced by using the data from Clarkson’s. Even in the original dataset 
used in Knapp and Franses (2007a), not all safety regimes are present but the inspection 
coverage lies by 60% of the ships eligible for inspections. 
 
Quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) is used as method of estimation (Greene, 2000, page 823) in 
order to give some allowance for a possible misspecification of the assumed underlying 
distribution function. The key statistics are presented in appendix 2 for the logit model. For the 
probit model we essentially find the same qualitative results. The rest of the statistics such as the 
McFadden R2 and the hit rate show acceptable results for all three models.  
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Table 4: List of Variables Used in Models 
 Variable Type Total 
 Total Number of Variables nℓ 
Variable ℓ Casualty (Very Serious, Serious, Less Serious) 0/1 1 
Ln(AGE) 1 Vessel Age at the time of casualty(or inspection) C 1 
Ln(SIZE) 2 Vessel Size in gross tonnage C 1 
ST 3 Ship Type  D(a) 6 
STInd 4 Indicates if ship type changed since construction D(s) 1 
CL1 5 
Classification Societies Group at time of casualty (or 
inspection) D(a) 3 
CL2 6 
Recognized Organization Group at time of casualty (or 
inspection) D(a) 3 
CLInd 7 Indicates if classification society changed over time D(s) 1 
CLWdr 8 Indicates if classification society withdrew D(s) 1 
CLRein 9 Indicates if classification was re-instated D(s) 1 
CLSurv 10 Indicates if classification survey was overdue D(s) 1 
ISM 11 Indicates if ship was audited for ISM D(s) 1 
DoC 12 Document of compliance company group D(a) 5 
DoCInd 13 Indicates if DoC company changed D(s) 1 
FS 14 Flag State Group at the time of casualty/inspection D(a) 4 
FSInd 15 Indicator if flag changed over time D(s) 1 
OWN 16 Ship Owner Countries D(a) 5 
OWNInd 17 Indicates if ownership was changed over time D(s) 1 
SY 18 Country Groups where ship was primarily built D 7 
LIOWN 19 Number of legal instruments owner country rectified C(s) 1 
LIFS 20 Number of legal instruments flag state has rectified C(s) 1 
ILO47 21 Indicates if flag has ratified ILO convention 147 D(s) 1 
ILOPro 22 Indicated if flag has ratified Protocol to ILO 147 D(s) 1 
DH 23 Double Hull D 1 
RS 24 Total # of inspections by Rightship C(s) 1 
CDI 25 Total # of inspections by CDI C(s) 1 
PSC 26 Indicated total # of inspections by PSC C(s) 1 
GR 27 Ship certified by Greenaward D(s) 1 
LN(CSI) 28 Clarkson’s Index (Earnings/day) C 1 
LN(SH) 29 Secondhand prices of ships C 1 
  Total for the whole dataset (split into seriousness)  56 
C = continuous, D = dummy of categorical variables, s=sum, a=average 
 
The models were reduced using a 1% significance level and the coefficients for the inspection 
variables (port state control and vetting inspections) were tested using the Wald Test for testing 
restrictions12 in order to see if the mean varies across the regimes. The null hypothesis (ho) for 
testing the restrictions states that the means do not vary across the regimes. The hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for very serious casualties (p- value 0.9137) and serious casualties (p-value 
0.0367) but it can be rejected for less serious casualties (p-value0.0039) for the three variables in 
question at 1% significance level. This result confirms that there is no difference in the effect of 
port state control inspections and vetting inspections in decreasing the probability of a very 
serious casualty and a serious casualty. The result is not surprising given the amount of 
overlapping in inspection areas identified in the qualitative part of this article. 
 
                                                
12 based on Wald Test for Testing Coefficient Restrictions, a standard procedure in Eviews 
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The remaining variables of interest can be found in Table 5. One can see that the partial effect of 
the ratification of legal instruments by flag is negative for all three types of casualties while it is 
positive for the country of ownership and the ISM audit. The result for the ISM is very 
interesting as it confirms that there is lack of proper implementation of the ISM code which has 
also been identified by Knapp and Franses (2007b&c) when they look at the effect of 
deficiencies found during an inspection. Another interesting result is the negative coefficient for 
the parameter indicating if a vessel’s class was re-instated which shows the effect of a 
classification society’s inspection before a vessel is re-instated. This effect is not significant for 
serious casualties. 
 
Table 5: Partial Effects of Variables of Interest 
 very serious serious less serious 
Variable of Interest  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 Class Reinstated -1.1232 n/s -0.2207 
 ISM audited 0.2000 0.0303 0.0279 
  Legal Instrument ratified: Flag -0.0247 -0.0512 -0.0569  
  Legal Instrument ratified: Owner 0.0410 0.0626 0.1024  
 ILO 147 ratified by flag n/s 0.3845 0.5904 
 ILO 147 Protocol ratified by flag n/s 0.2377 0.2452 
  Total number of inspections Rightship -0.4046 -0.1034 -0.1136  
 Total number of inspections CDI -0.3862 -0.0823 n/s 
 Total number of inspections PSC -0.3563 -0.0509 -0.0485 
  Greenaward Certified n/s n/s n/s  
  Clarksons’ Index (Earnings/day) -1.6224 -0.7182 -0.6167  
  Secondhand prices of ships 6.0022 2.5263 n/s  
Note: n/s = not significant at a 1% level,  
 
Ratification of ILO convention 147 and its protocol is not significant for very serious casualties 
and positive for serious and less serious casualties. This can be interpreted as a lack of 
enforcement of the ILO convention which is confirmed by the qualitative findings of this article 
as very little emphasis is placed on this area during the inspections. 
 
The rest of the inspection variables are all negative compared to ships that were not inspected at 
all or inspected by another port state control regime or vetting inspection regime and is strongest 
for very serious casualties compared to serious and less serious casualties. For the Greenaward 
Foundation, certification of a certain vessel does not come out to be significant which might be 
due to the small number of ships (around 170 vessels) that are certified. 
 
Finally, the economic variables indicate that an increase in earnings have a negative effect on the 
probability of casualties based on the time period 1999 to 2004. This can indicate that when the 
shipping market is good, more money is spent on safety. The effect is strongest for very serious 
casualties. The opposite is true for the second hand prices of vessels which show a positive 
effect. As second hand prices of vessels increase, the probability of casualty increases 
respectively. 
 
Visualization of Results 
The last part of this section will provide a visualization of the results, in particular the effect of 
inspections per seriousness of casualty. Figure 4 is based on a high risk ship profile of a tanker 
and shows how the probability of casualty decreases per number of inspections. For very serious 
casualties, the probability is also shown with no inspections. This can be produced for any 
particular vessel given its ship particulars, their changes over time and inspection history. For 
this graph, the average probability of all three inspection regimes is shown since no significant 
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difference was found through the Wald Test for testing of the differences in the coefficients for 
very serious and serious casualties. For less serious casualties, only two regimes remain to be 
significant (port state control and Rightship) and for the sake of simplicity, they are also 
combined to an average probability. One can easily see the stronger effect for very serious 
casualties and the weaker effect for the other two. 
 
Figure 4: Probability of Casualty per Frequency of Inspection 
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Figure 5 then provides a refined view for the probability of a very serious casualty per ship type. 
The same ship profile is used for this graph for the base probability. This is then complemented 
by the ship type and the type of inspections that are performed. All ship types have to undergo 
port state control inspections while tankers are exposed to all vetting inspections and dry bulk 
carriers to inspections from Rightship in particular. The result is given in the graph where one 
can easily see that tankers and dry bulk carriers show a steeper curve compared to the other ship 
types since it shows the combined effect of all the inspections that are performed on tankers. 
 
While container vessels are not yet exposed to vetting inspections intensively, they show the 
same base probability (at inspection frequency zero) as tankers and dry bulk carriers. The base 
probability is slightly higher for general cargo vessels and passenger vessels and decreases 
slower compared to the other ship types. 
 
The last graph visualizes the effect of earnings expressed through the Clarkson’s Shipping Index 
for all three types of casualties. One can easily see in Figure 6 that the probability of a very 
serious casualty increases strongly as earnings increase while the effect is much weaker for 
serious and less serious casualties. 
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Figure 5: Effect of Inspections per Ship Type 
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Figure 6: Effect of Earnings on the Probability of Casualty 
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The figures provide an interesting result. It indicates that the economic situation of the shipping 
market seems to have an effect of the safety quality of a vessel. In addition, no significant 
difference between inspections can be found and there seems to be an optimum of inspections to 
be performed in the name of safety. The fact that the two lines in Figure 4 cross can further 
indicate that the benefit of inspecting a vessel by decreasing the probability of casualty is partly 
offset by a higher probability of a serious casualty. 
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A reflection of this result could be that if too many inspections are performed fatigue of crew 
due to the increased work load during port operations increases. This argument can be supported 
by the result of the qualitative analysis which has shown the high amount of inspection 
frequencies and hours that are allocated onboard for inspections (up to 10 hours) per inspection 
which are performed during critical port operations. It can further be supported by the lack of 
enforcement of ILO 147 which was clearly shown by the regression results. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This article provided a comprehensive overview of the overall complexity of the safety regimes 
from various angles based on qualitative and quantitative analysis. Quantitative analysis has 
shown that there is a negative effect of inspections towards the probability of casualty and that 
the ratification of conventions further implies enforcement since its effect is also negative 
towards the probability of casualty. This does hold not to ILO 147 and its protocol or ISM 
audits. Average estimated insurance claims are significantly higher than inspection costs which 
further implies that the system overall is successful in eliminating substandard vessels. However, 
there is room for improvement of the safety system. 
 
The lack of trust in the industry between flag states, port states, classification societies, insurance 
companies and cargo owners has created a playground for many inspections which are 
performed on certain ship types (oil tankers, chemical tankers and dry bulk carriers) in the name 
of safety and during critical port operations. Total inspection costs per vessel per year are 
estimated to vary from USD 47,166 for tankers to USD 17,464 for other ship types while the 
frequency of inspections can also vary considerably but is estimated to be at 11 inspections per 
year for tankers, 6 for dry bulk carriers and 5 for all other ship types.  
 
The areas that are inspected in all of these inspections show a considerable amount of 
overlapping between statutory and industry driven inspections. In addition, no significant 
difference in the effect of these inspections towards decreasing the probability of casualty can be 
found. 
 
The various types of inspections and the combination of statutory inspection and industry 
inspection requirements can add confusion to onboard operations due to conflicting 
requirements. With shortened time in ports, inspections can increase the working hours of 
shipboard personnel considerable and thereby increase fatigue and possibly offset the positive 
effect of the inspection. 
 
In addition, the safety regimes do not accept port state control inspections that are performed in 
another regime or refer to industry inspections despite the fact that the effect of inspections on 
decreasing the probability of casualty has been quantified for various regimes including one 
vetting inspection regime. The inspection data is further not taken into consideration when 
targeting vessels which impairs the ability to correctly target vessels that could benefit from an 
inspection. 
 
The underlying question is how the functioning of the safety regimes can be improved and how 
the money which is allocated to port state control or other inspections can be better used to 
eliminate substandard ships? 
 
One could argue that the money allocated to port state control inspections with zero deficiencies 
could better be used to create a better framework to harmonize port state control activities by 
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assisting emerging regimes. While this initiative was partly supported by the flag state sub-
committee meeting at IMO in June 2006, process is very slow and impaired by politics. IMO’s 
Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS) contains a port state and casualty module 
which could easily combine data on all inspections and casualties but lacks acceptance from the 
member states and data is partly not submitted to the database. Port state control regimes are not 
yet open to accept inspections that were performed in other regimes or to take information of 
industry inspection into account despite the fact that the effects towards decreasing the 
probability of casualty could be measured. This lack of cooperation further impairs the 
possibility to enforce the rectification of deficiencies since each regime only looks at its own 
data. 
 
In conclusion, while the maritime safety system seems to be successful in eliminating 
substandard vessels, the system could be made more effective by combining data sources on 
inspections and to use them respectively to improve risk profiling and to shift inspection efforts 
to the ships and regions of the world where they are needed most. This would imply to overcome 
the various political barriers in the shipping industry and would call for more cooperation 
between regulators and the industry. Improved risk profiling and sharing of inspection data 
through GISIS could further help to decrease inspection frequencies onboard ships that are over-
inspected. Finally, more emphasis should be put on the human factor onboard ships such as crew 
working and living conditions which are mostly not taken into consideration during the 
inspections. 
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Appendix 1: Inspection Matrix – Comparison of Main Inspection Areas of Safety Inspections/Surveys/Audits 
  Compiled by author  Party performing the inspection/survey/audit  
  Inspection Matrix - Main Areas of Inspection Source of Inspection Port & Flag State or Class Industry  
  
Legend: 
x = part of inspection round 
r = referred during inspection 
i = actual physical inspection/testing/interviews 
s = depends on situation, for class on the type of 
survey (annual, intermediate, renewal) 
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Average Time 
onboard (hrs.) 
  
6-8 8 24-48 8 8 8-10 8-48 9 
 
Registration & Administration (Certificates)              
  Statutory Certificates various x  r r  r r r r r 
  Crew Certificates (plus Endorsements) SOLAS/STCW x  r r  r r r r r 
  Crew Nationality   x       r  
  Medicals  x  r r  r r r r r 
  Other Certificates for Equipment Testing various x  r r  r r r r r 
  Previous Port State Control/Flag State Reports    x  r  r r r r r 
  Vetting Inspection Reports   x       r r 
Master, Chief 
Officer 
Living and Working Conditions             
  Accommodation ILO x  x x   x x x x 
  Food (Inspection of Freezers and Galley) ILO x  x x   x x x x 
  Living Conditions/Public Spaces ILO x  x x   x x x x 
  Rest Periods and Watch Keeping Hours STCW x  r r  r r r x r 
  Safety Signs, Protection Equipment SOLAS   x x x x x x x x 
  Gas Detection and Calibration SOLAS/ISM   x x i x x x x x 
  Decontamination showers and eyewash on deck SOLAS/ISM   x x i x x x x x 
  Mooring Arrangements Safe & Maintained SOLAS/ISM x  x x x x x x x x 
  Hospital and Medical Attention  x  x x x x x x x x 
Chief Officer, 
Third Officer, 
Cook 
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   Appendix 1 continued  Party performing the inspection/survey/audit  
  Inspection Matrix - Main Areas of Inspection Source of Inspection Port & Flag State or Class Industry  
  
 Legend: 
x = part of inspection round 
r = referred during inspection 
i = actual physical inspection/testing/interviews 
s = depends on situation, for class on the type of 
survey (annual, intermediate, renewal) 
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Management ISM             
  Safety Management System/Master's Authority SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r r r i 
  Safety & Environmental Policy SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r r r i 
  DoC Company and Designated Person Ashore SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r x r i 
  Company Internal Audits SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r x r i 
  Records of Incidents/Near Misses/Accidents SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i x x r i 
  Maintenance Routines, Non-conformities SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r x r i 
  
Operational Safety - Safety Procedures (Hot Work, 
Entry into enclosed spaces) SOLAS/ISM x  r r  i r r r i 
  Safety, Fire and Abandon Ship Drills SOLAS/ISM x  i(s) i(s)  r r x r i 
  Onboard Communication satisfactory    x x  x x x x x 
  Crew Familiarization ISM x   x  i r x i x 
  Company Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing   x     r x r x 
  Crew Working Experience   x      x i x 
  Manning and Training Policy   x     r x i x 
  Security Related Items SOLAS/ISPS   x x    x x x 
Master, Chief 
Officer, Third 
Officer 
Safety and Fire Appliances              
  SOLAS Training Manuals SOLAS x  x x x x x x x x 
  Muster Lists and Emergency Instructions SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  
Lifesaving Appliances (Lifejackets, Immersion Suits, 
etc) SOLAS x  i i i x i i x x 
  Lifeboat, Life rafts, Equipment and Launching  SOLAS x  i i i x i i x x 
Chief Officer, 
Third Officer 
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   Appendix 1 continued  Party performing the inspection/survey/audit  
  Inspection Matrix - Main Areas of Inspection Source of Inspection Port & Flag State or Class Industry  
  
 Legend: 
x = part of inspection round 
r = referred during inspection 
i = actual physical inspection/testing/interviews 
s = depends on situation, for class on the type of 
survey (annual, intermediate, renewal) 
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  Rescue Boat and equipment SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  Pilot Ladder, Embarkation Ladders for Lifeboats SOLAS x  i i i x i i x x 
  Oxygen & Acetylene Storage, CO2 room SOLAS x  i i i x i i x x 
  Fire Control Plan SOLAS x  r r i x r r r r 
  Fire Fighting Equipment and Detection SOLAS x  i i i x i i x x 
  
Fireman's outfit, breathing apparatus, air bottles, 
EEBD SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  Fire/Foam Hydrants SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  Industry Guidelines/Publications   x     x x i x 
 
Navigation and Communication              
  Company Navigation Procedures STCW x  x x x x x x x x 
  Bridge Standing Orders SOLAS x  x x x x x x x x 
  Passage Planning STCW x  x x x x x x x x 
  Chart Corrections SOLAS x  x x x x x x x x 
  Nautical Publications up to date various x x x x x x x x x x 
  
Navigational Equipment Working (GPS, Speed Log, 
Radar, Echo Sounder, Compass, Navtex etc.) SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  Dead man Alarm (when applicable)  x  x x x x x x x x 
  Guidelines for the prevention of fatigue   x       r  
  Crew knows how to operate equipment STCW x  x x x x x x x x 
  VDR/AIS SOLAS x  x x i  x x x x 
  Compass Error Log STCW x  x x x  x x x x 
Chief Officer, 
Second 
Officer 
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   Appendix 1 continued  Party performing the inspection/survey/audit  
  Inspection Matrix - Main Areas of Inspection Source of Inspection Port & Flag State or Class Industry  
  
 Legend: 
x = part of inspection round 
r = referred during inspection 
i = actual physical inspection/testing/interviews 
s = depends on situation, for class on the type of 
survey (annual, intermediate, renewal) 
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  Compass Deviation Card SOLAS x  x x x  x x x x 
  Navigation Lights COLREG x  x x i  x i x x 
  GMDSS Operations and Testing SOLAS/STCW x  x x i  x x x x 
  EPIRB and SART SOLAS x  x x i  x x x x 
 
Ship and Cargo Operations including Pollution Prevention           
  Loading and Stability Manuals IBC/BCH x  r r r x r r x x 
  Cargo loading limitations IBC/BCH x  r r r x r r x x 
  Damage/survival stability guidelines IBC/BCH x  r r r x r r x x 
  Procedures and Arrangement Manual MARPOL x  r r r x r r x x 
  High level alarms operative IBC x  x x i x x x x x 
  Bilge Alarms SOLAS x  i x i x i i x i 
  Portable or fixed gas detection systems SOLAS x  x x i x x x x x 
  Inert gas system or other systems to blanket cargo    x x x x x x x x 
  15 ppm Alarm MARPOL x  i i i x i i x i 
  Oil-Mist Detector SOLAS x  i i i x i i i i 
  SOPEP, SMPEP MARPOL x  r r r x r r x x 
  Cargo Record Book, Oil Record Book, Garbage RB MARPOL x  r r r x r r x x 
  Tank cleaning and washing including COW MARPOL x  r r x x  x x x 
  Industry Guidelines/Publications   x     x x x x 
  Cargo Operations in General including Pump Room various  x x x   x i x x 
  Cargo Transfer Operations various  x x x   x i x x 
Chief Officer, 
Chief 
Engineer 
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   Appendix 1 continued  Party performing the inspection/survey/audit  
  Inspection Matrix - Main Areas of Inspection Source of Inspection Port & Flag State or Class Industry  
  
 Legend: 
x = part of inspection round 
r = referred during inspection 
i = actual physical inspection/testing/interviews 
s = depends on situation, for class on the type of 
survey (annual, intermediate, renewal) 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
s
t
a
t
u
t
o
r
y
)
 
F
l
a
g
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
A
d
d
.
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
P
o
r
t
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
(
m
o
r
e
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
i
n
s
p
.
)
 
F
l
a
g
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
C
l
a
s
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
I
S
M
 
(
e
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
)
 
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
(
P
&
I
 
C
l
u
b
s
)
 
C
D
I
/
O
C
I
M
F
 
R
i
g
h
t
s
h
i
p
 
G
r
e
e
n
a
w
a
r
d
 
(
S
h
i
p
s
i
d
e
 
P
a
r
t
)
 
S
h
i
p
 
C
r
e
w
 
I
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
  Fuel Testing, sulphur content measurement   x        r 
  Anti-fouling system for hull coating (TBT free) MARPOL x   r    r  r 
  Additional Oil Pollution Prevention Measures   x      r  r 
 
Machinery Related Areas including Engine Room             
  Engine Room Standing Orders SOLAS/ISM x  x x x x x x x x 
  Planned Maintenance System SOLAS x  r r i x r i x x 
  Emergency Steering Gear SOLAS x  i i i  i i i i 
  Emergency Fire Pump SOLAS x  i i i  i i i i 
  Emergency Generator SOLAS x  i i i  i i i i 
  Emergency Batteries SOLAS x  x x x  x x x x 
  Testing of Black Out and Reverse Polarity    i(s)  i   i(s) i(s) x 
  Overall Cleanliness and Appearance of ER    x x x x x x x x 
Chief 
Engineer, 
First or 
Second 
Engineer 
Stability & Structure              
  ESP, Thickness Measurements  SOLAS x  r r i(s) r r r r r 
  CAS (Condition Assessment Scheme) MARPOL x  r r i(s) r r r r r 
  
Inspections of Ballast Tanks, Cargo Tanks, Void 
Spaces, Cofferdams for Condition of 
Coating/Corrosion SOLAS/MARPOL   x r i(s) r r x i r 
  Rating System for Condition of Coating/Corrosion as per ESP/CAS x  r r i(s) r r r i r 
  Conditions of Hull and Superstructure Good/Fair/Poor x  x x i(s) x i(s) x i i 
  Class Conditions and Memoranda   x r r  r r r r r 
Master, Chief 
Officer, Chief 
Engineer 
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Appendix 2: Key Statistics of Final Models: Probability of Casualty 
  Very Serious Serious Less Serious 
0 = 37738 0 = 37738 0 = 37738 
1 = 772 1 = 3385 1 = 2221 # observations in final model 
Total = 38510 Total = 41123 Total = 39959 
# of outliers 61 nil nil 
Cut Off 0.020 0.082 0.056 
  LOG PRO LOG PRO LOG PRO 
Mc Fadden R2 0.399 0.394 0.182 0.181 0.153 0.152 
% Hit Rate y=0 84.58 83.15 77.35 75.93 73.67 71.69 
% Hit Rate y=1 80.57 83.03 67.18 69.13 67.81 70.01 
% Hit Rate Tot 84.50 83.14 76.52 75.37 73.34 71.59 
HL-Stat. (df=8) 10.26 78.85 12.37 16.57 19.44 23.27 
p-value 0.2469 0.0000 0.1253 0.0349 0.0127 0.003 
 
